41 MASON STREET - ZBA V 1 Mason S{c�e.1r
CLERK'S NOTICE DOCKET NUMBER Trial Court of Massachusetts ,_
1277CV02212 The Superior Court
CASE NAME:
Northeast Behavioral Health Corporation vs. Rebecca Curran / Thomas H. Driscoll, Jr., Clerk of Courts
member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals et al
TO: COURT NAME&ADDRESS
Leonard F Femino, Esq.
Alexander& Femino Essex County Superior Court-Newburvport
145 Hiph Street
One School St Newburyport, MA 01950
Beverly, MA 01915
You are hereby notified that on 11/01/2017 the following entry was made on the above
referenced docket:
MEMORANDUM &ORDER: �f
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: IV. I
ORDER- For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and the defendants'
cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Judgment shall enter for the plaintiff, vacating the order of the
ZBA. The court declares that the condition of the variance pertaining to the property at 41 Mason Street in Salem,
Massachusetts limiting the hours of operation on the premises to 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. daily is inapplicable to the
current usage of the property by the plaintiff, as a non-profit educational organization, for educational purposes.
Dated 11/1/17 (See "Memorandum of Decision and Order on Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment" dated
11/1/17 for full text of decision.)
Judge: Lang, Hon. James F
DATEISSUED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE/ ASSISTANT CLERK SESSION PHONE#
11/01/2017 Hon.James F Lang (978)462-0474
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
i
ESSEX,ss. SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
No. 2012-2212-B
NORTHEAST BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
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VS.
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REBECCA CURRAN,ANNIE HARRIS,JAMIE METSCH,MUM DUFFY,
and RICHARD DIONNE,as Members of the CITY OF SALEM ZONING
BOARD OF APPEALS,and THOMAS ST.PIERRE,as BUILDING INSPECTOR
of the CITY OF SALEM,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND
ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff,Northeast Behavioral Health Corporation,has moved pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.
P. 56 for summaryjudgment as to its G.L. c.40A,s. 17 challenge to the decision of the defendant,
Salem Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), to upbold a cease and desist order issued by the Salem
Building Inspector relative to the use of property at 41 Mason Street in Salem (the property). The
plaintiff also seeks summary judgment as to both its prayer to enjoin enforcement of the order and
its request for a judicial declaration that a certain variance upon which the ZBA relied in its ruling
is inapplicable to the property. The defendants have cross-moved for summary judgment. A
non-evidentiary hearing was held on the motion on October 20,2017. For the reasons that follow, I
the plaintiff s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and the defendants' cross-motion for i
summary judgment is DENIED. III
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II. STIPULATED FACTS
The parties have stipulated that the following material facts are undisputed:
1. The plaintiff is a non-profit educational organization that,since 2006,has leased a portion
of the property for non-profit educational purposes. Clients who are in behavioral crisis are referred
to the plaintiff by police,medical providers,social agencies,court members, and others.
2. The plaintiff is engaged in the correction ofbehavioral problems,especially those relating
to drug and alcohol abuse,by counseling and behavior modification. The nature of the plaintiff's
work requires it to operate 24 hours per day. Referrals of clients occur at all hours of the day and
night, and frequently between 6:00 p.m.and 7:00 a.m.
3. Since the inception of its operations at the property in 2006,the plaintiff has conducted
its activities 24 hours per day.
4. On or about August 1, 2012, the Salem Building Inspector wrote to the owner of the
property, directing that the plaintiff cease and desist its operations from 6:00 p.m.to 7:00 a.m. In
this cease and desist order (the order), the Inspector stated that, under Condition #11 of a prior
variance decision of March 19,2003 relating to the property and a prior use,the hours of use of the
property were so limited.
5. The plaintiff timely appealed the order to the ZBA pursuant to G.L.c.40A,ss. 8, 14,and
15 and Section 9.3.2 of the Salem Zoning Ordinance. On November 7,2012, after a hearing,the
ZBA denied the appeal and unanimously upheld the order. Its decision was filed with the Salem City
Clerk on November 20,2012. In its written decision,the ZBA found:(a)a condition that was placed
on the prior variance from otherwise applicable dimensional restrictions limited the hours of
operation of all tenants,and,without such limitation,the enlargement of the building may not have
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occurred; thus, the hours of operation restriction was a safeguard on dimensional control; (b)the
limitations in hours were intended to serve a municipal goal, and there was ample supporting
evidence in the record, including police reports and the testimony of neighbors, to support the
condition as necessary; and(c)the ZBA did not make a finding as to whether the plaintiff was an
educational use entitled to protection under G.L. c.40A,s. 3.1
III.DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Judicial Court has described the applicable standard of review in a case such
as the instant one thusly:
Review of [zoning]board's decision in the Superior Courtpursuant to G.L.
c.40A,s. 17,involves a"peculiar"combination of de novo and deferential analyses.
Pendergast v. Board ofAppeals of Barnstable,331 Mass.555,558, 120 N.E.2d 916
(1954). Although fact finding in the Superior Court is de novo,a judge must review
with deference legal conclusions within the authority of the board. Mellendick v.
Zoning Bd ofAppeals ofEdgartown,69 Mass.App. Ct. 852,857, 872 N.E.2d 1125
(2007),quoting Cameron v. Di Virgilio,55 Mass.App. Ct.24,29,768 N.E.2d 1094
(2002)("reasonable construction that a zoning board ofappeals gives to the by-laws
it is charged with implementing is entitled to deference"). Among the purposes of
the act is to achieve "greater implementation of the powers granted to
municipalities,"including"restricting,prohibiting,permitting or regulating"the uses
of land. St.1975,c. 808,s. 2A. These powers are not to be"narrowly"construed.
Collura v.Arlington,367 Mass. 881, 885, 329 N.E.2d 733 (1975),citing Decoulos
v. Peabody,360 Mass.428,429,274 N.E.2d 816(1971). Deference is also owed to
a local zoning board because of its special knowledge of"the history and purpose of
its town's zoning by-law." Duteau v. Zoning Bd ofAppeals of Webster, 47 Mass.
App. Ct. 664, 669, 715 N.E.2d 470 (1999). Accordingly, a judge.must give
"substantial deference" to a board's interpretation of its zoning bylaws and
ordinances. Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509
'The parties advised the court at the summary judgment hearing that the City of Salem
has opted not to enforce its cease and desist order during the pendency of this action, which was
filed in 2010. The court understands, then, that at all times since the plaintiff began its
operations on the property, and up to the present,the plaintiff's hours of operation have not been
restricted in any way.
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N.E.2d 1173 (1987). While ajudge is to give"no evidentiary weight"to the board's
factual findings,the decision of a board"cannot be disturbed unless it is based on a
legally untenable ground"or is based on an"unreasonable,whimsical,capricious or
arbitrary" exercise of its judgment in applying land use regulation to the facts as
found by the judge. Roberts v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.,429 Mass.478,
487, 709 N.E.2d 798 (1999),quoting MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals ofDuxbury,
356 Mass. 635, 639, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Zaltman v. Board of Appeals of
Stoneham, 357 Mass. 482, 485, 258 N.E.2d 565 (1970). Although the judge
determines the facts,it is"the board's evaluation of the seriousness of the problem,
not the judge's, which is controlling." Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of
Appeals of Canton, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 488, 395 N.E.2d 880 (1979), quoting
Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass.App.Ct. 821, 821,296 N.E.2d 716
(1973).
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[J]udicial review of a board's decision"involves a highly deferential bow to
local control over community planning[.]" Britton v. Zoning Bd of Appeals of
Gloucester, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 68,73,794 N.E.2d 1198 (2003)[.]
Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y. ,Inc. v. Board ofAppeals of Billerica,454 Mass.374-
381-382(2009) (footnotes omitted).
B. Analysis
The parties agree that, based on the stipulated facts, this case is appropriate for final
adjudication by entry of summaryjudgment. They differ,however,as to which party should prevail.
Resolution of their competing motions turns largely on the court's interpretation of G.L.c.40A, s.
3,second par.,the so-called"Dover Amendment,"which provides in pertinent part:
No zoning ordinance or by-law shall . . .prohibit,regulate or restrict the use
of land or structures for religious purposes or for educational purposes on land owned
or leased by the commonwealth or any of its agencies,subdivisions or bodies politic
or by a religious sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit educational corporation;
provided, however, that such land or structures may be subject to reasonable
regulations concerning the bulk and height of structures and determining yard sizes,
lot area,setbacks,open space,parking and building coverage requirements.
G.L. c. 40A, s. 3, second par. "[T]he Dover Amendment represents a specific exception to the
general power of municipalities to adopt and enforce zoning regulations and by-laws." Regis
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College v. Town of Weston,462 Mass. 280;289 (2012). "The whole of the Dover Amendment
. . . seeks to strike a balance between preventing local discrimination against an educational use,
...and honoring legitimate municipal concerns that typically find expression in local zoning laws."
Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753, 757(1993) (citation omitted).
The ZBA agrees,for present purposes,that the plaintiff qualifies as a nonprofit educational
corporation whose educational activities at the property come within the ambit of the protections
from zoning restrictions that are afforded by the Dover Amendment. The parties differ,however,
as to whether the hours of operation limitation that has been imposed upon the plaintiff is
nonetheless permissible. '
For its part,the plaintiffprincipally relies on the express language of the second clause of the
amendment,noting,correctly,that a limitation on the hours of operation does not appear among the
permissible restrictions that may be imposed upon protected educational activities. With respect to I
the question whether a condition that was imposed on the property by a variance that was issued
prior to the inception of the use protected under s. 3 remains extant after such protected use begins,
the plaintiff cites Rosenfeld v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Mendon, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 679
(2011).
In Rosenfeld, the owner of a46-acre parcel of land in Mendon sought approval from the local
zoning board to construct a horseback riding facility that would include,among other structures, a
primary residence, a trainer's residence, and stables. Id. at 678. A prior owner had obtained two
prior and successive variances from frontage requirements to permit construction of a single-family
residence on the property,but the grant of the variances was conditioned on the imposition of a deed
restriction that limited the use of the property to just that residence. Id. After some litigation in
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Land Court,the zoning board approved the new proposed development of the property,concluding
that it was entitled to the protections of s.3 as an agricultural use. Id. at 679. Abutters brought suit
to challenge that ruling,arguing that the prior variances had not lapsed,contrary to the earlier ruling
of the Land Court. Id. The Superior Courtjudge granted summary judgment to the property owner.
Id. The Appeals Court's affirmed the summary judgment ruling, stating:
Before the Superior Court and on appeal, the plaintiffs principally contend
that the board erred in accepting the conclusion of the Land Courtjudge that the prior
variances had lapsed. Because the variances remain in effect,the plaintiffs contend,
the conditions imposed by the variances likewise remain in effect and operate to
preclude the proposed use. The argument rests on a fundamental misconception.
The variances famished relief from otherwise applicable requirements ofthe zoning
by-law,and the conditions imposed by the variances operate as preconditions to the
enjoyment of that relief. However, they do not operate independently to limit the
permissible use of the property. The board's conclusion that the proposed use is
protected by G.L.c.40A,s.3,stands as a wholly independent basis authorizing the
proposed use,rendering the variances,and the conditions thereto,entirely irrelevant.
We accordingly need not, and do not, consider whether the Land Court judge was
correct in his conclusion that the variances had lapsed.
Id. The plaintiff reads Rosenfeld, sensibly in this court's view, to make clear, in effect, prior
limitations on property use that conflict with the provisions of s. 3 are a nullity.
In its own argument for summary judgment,the ZBA first seeks to distinguish Rosenfeld
on the ground that, in that case, the prior restriction at issue completely prohibited the proposed
agricultural use that is protected by s. 3, whereas, in the instant case the limitation of hours of i
operation still permits the plaintiff to pursue its protected educational activities. The courtdoes not
find that point of distinction persuasive, especially in light of the stipulation of the parties that the
nature of the plaintiff s work requires it to operate 24 hours per day. The ZBA also asserts that the
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"reasonable regulations"that maybe imposed under the second clause of s. 3 upon protected uses
are broader than the express language of that clause might otherwise indicate. But it relies
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principally upon a Land Court case in support of that proposition, a decision which this court was
unable to access, and the excerpts from the Land Court's decision that the ZBA quotes in its brief
fall short of squarely supporting the ZBA's interpretation of s.3's proviso.'
The ZBA asserts that the limitation of hours of operation serves a legitimate municipal
purpose. The court has no quarrel with that assertion, and the ZBA properly so found. But ihat is
not the determination upon which the court's decision in this instance turns. For that reason,the
court finds inapposite the remaining case upon which the ZBA relies,Bateman v. Board ofAppeals
i
of Georgetown,56 Mass.App.Ct.236(2002). There,the Appeals Court affirmed a Superior Court
judge's prior affirmance of a local zoning board's issuance of a variance to permit the construction
'Nor do the appellate cases that are cited by the Land Court in the excerpts of its decision
that the ZBA has quoted provide such direct support. Illustrative is Trustees of Tufts College, in
which the court discussed the Dover Amendment,stating:
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Local zoning requirements adopted under the proviso to the Dover Amendment
which serve legitimate municipal purposes sought to be achieved by local zoning,
such as promoting public health or safety,preserving the character of an adjacent
neighborhood, or one of the other purposes sought to be achieved by local zoning
. . .,may be permissibly enforced,consistent with the Dover Amendment, against
an educational use. See Radcliffe College v. Cambridge, 350 Mass. 613,215
N.E.2d 892(1966); The Bible Speaks v. Board ofAppeals of Lenox, 8 Mass. App.
Ct. 19, 31, 391 N.E.2d 279 (1979) (a building inspector may properly deny
permits to an educational institution for a structure that does not comply with
"reasonable regulations"). See also Southern New England Conference Assn of
Seventh—Day Adventists v. Burlington,21 Mass.App. Ct. 701,710,490 N.E.2d
451 (1986)(local zoning law protecting wetlands applied to property protected by
Dover Amendment). The Radcliffe College case [Radtke College Y.
Cambridge, 350 Mass. 613 (1966)] suggests that a local zoning provision that
requires an educational institution to adapt plans for the use of its land may be
enforced, so long as the provision is shown to be related to a legitimate municipal
concern,and its application bears a rational relationship to the perceived concern.
415 Mass. at 757-758. While the quoted passage provides useful guidance as to the purpose of
the Dover Amendment and its proviso,it does not undermine the plaintiff's plain language
interpretation of s. 3.
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of a riding academy and public stable,with an imposed restriction on the hours of operation. Id. at
236-237,241-242 . Significantly, the issue of the permissibility under s. 3 of the operating hours
limitation was not before the court. While the ZBA argues that the Bateman court tacitly approved
the limitation when it cited the limitation in support of the lower court's determination that the
variance would not harm the public,see id.at 241-242,the court was not dealing with a claim by an
entity that enjoys the protections of s.3.that such a restriction was impermissible. Rather,Bateman
was a case brought by abutters who were challenging the board's issuance of the variance,and they
had no reason to contest the restriction. Nor,for whatever reason,did the protected entity contest
it. So the Bateman court did not have occasion to consider whether the restriction was prohibited
by s.3,i.e.,whether it was not among the restrictions permitted under the proviso'
In sum, the court concludes that the limitation of hours of operation restriction that was
imposed as a condition of the previously-issued variance for the property may be objectively
reasonable and supported by legitimate municipal considerations relating to the nature of the
neighborhood and the well being of abutters,but it is nevertheless beyond the scope of restrictions
that are permissible under s. 3 with respect to protected educational activities. Accordingly, the
decision of the ZBA upholding the cease and desist order must be vacated.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,the plaintiffs motion for summaryjudgment is ALLOWED and
the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Judgment shall enter for the
'The court notes that,in its written decision,the ZBA indicated that it viewed the hours of
operation restriction to have had a relationship to dimensional control,which is an expressly
permitted purpose of regulation under s. 3's proviso,as it was imposed as a condition to the grant
of a variance to allow construction of an addition on the existing building. The ZBA has not
pursued that argument before this court, which, in any event, this court finds unavailing.
8
plaintiff, vacating the order of the ZBA. The court declares that the condition of the variance
pertaining to the property at 41 Mason Street in Salem,Massachusetts limiting the hours of operation
i
on the premises to 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m, daily is inapplicable to the current usage of the property
by the plaintiff, as a non-profit educational organization,for educational purposes.
P
e Lang
Associate Justice of the S erior Court
November 1,2017
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,
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9
Trial Court of Massachusetts
SUMMARYJUDGMENT }p,
1277CV02212
MASS.R.CN.P.56 The Superior Court Uf
DOCKET NUMBER Thomas H. Driscoll, Jr., Clerk of Courts
CASE NAME COURT NAME 8 ADDRESS
Northeast Behavioral Health Corporation Essex Countv Superior Court-Newburyport
Rebecca Curran/member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals et at
145 Hiph Street
Newburyport, MA 01950
JUDGMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING PLAINTIFF($)
Northeast Behavioral Health Corporation
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE FOLLOVW9NG DEFENDANT(S)
Rebecca Curran/member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals
Annie Harris/member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals
Jamie Metsch/member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals
Mike Duffy/member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals
Richard Dionne/member of the Salem Zoning Board of Appeals
Thomas St.Pierre as he is Building Commissioner of the City of Salem
This action came before the Court, Hon.James F Lang, presiding, upon Motion for Summary Judgment of the
plaintiff named above,pursuant to Mass. R.Civ. P.56. The parties having been heard,and/or the Court having
considered the pleadings and submissions,finds there Is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. i
It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
that judgment enter for the plaintiff, Northeast Behavioral Health Corporation,VACATING the order of the defendants,
Rebecca Curren,Annie Hams, Jamie Metsch, Mike Duffy and Richard Dionne,as Members of the City of Salem Zoning
Board of Appeals,and Thomas St. Pierre,as Building Inspector of the City of Salem. Dated 11/1/17
DATE JUDGMENT ENTERED CLERK OF COURTS/ASST.CLERK
11/01/2017
Datefnm Prl ed: 11-01-201719V2.'67 SCV06/:03/2016
CI IY OF SALEM. MA
BOARD OF APPEAL CLERK'S OFFICE
120 WASHINGTON STREET, 3RD FLOOR
I
alp,
l ;r� ;II SALEM. MA O 1970
TEL. (978) 745-9595
FAX (978) 740-9846
STANLEY J. USOVICZ, JR. _1001 MAR 21 A 10: 41
MAYOR
DECISION OF THE PETITION OF STEPHEN W. HALEY REQUESTING
A VARIANCE FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT 41 MASON STREET I
A hearing on this petition was held March 19, 2003,with the following Board Members
present: Nina Cohen, Nicholas Halides, Stephen Harris, Bonnie Belier and Joseph
Barbeau. Notice of the hearing was sent to abutters and others and notices of the
hearing were properly published in the Salem Evening News in accordance with
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 40A.
The petitioner is requesting Variances from side and rear setbacks, parking and density
requirements to construct an addition for the property located at 41 Mason Street located
in an I zone.
The Variances, which have been requested, may be granted upon a finding by this
Board that:
a. Special conditions and circumstances exist which especially affect the land, building
or structure involved and which are not generally affecting other lands, buildings and
structure involve.
b. Literal enforcement of the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance would involve
substantial hardship, financial or otherwise, to the petitioners.
c. Desirable relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and
without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent of the district of the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Board of Appeal, after careful consideration of the evidence presented at the
hearing, and after viewing the plans, makes the following findings of fact:
1. Petitioner Stephen Haley owns and operates Crown Auto Supply, a wholesale
auto parts business located at 45 Mason Street adjacent to the subject property.
Several other businesses also operate at the 45 Mason Street property, and Mr.
Haley currently holds a license to offers used cars for sale at 43 Mason Street.
2. Petitioner seeks to renovate a former tannery building at 41 Mason Street for
commercial and light industrial use. The existing structure is nonconforming as
to minimum lot area, frontage, front and side yard setbacks, and it does not offer
sufficient off street parking to meet the requirements of the ordinance for
commercial or industrial use.
3. Architect Richard Griffin of 37 Turner Street, Salem, detailed the proposed
renovation. A three story wood structure at the Mason St. property line is
unsound and it will be demolished A single story brick structure behind the wood
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V.f
DECISION OF THE PETITION OF STEPHEN HALELY REQUESTING A
VARIANCE FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT 41 MASON STREET i
page two
structure has been gutted and cleaned; it has been determined to be free of
contamination arising from its former use. Mr. Haley proposes to construct
commercial offices within the existing walls of the brick building and to create a new
single story addition on the southeast corner of the property. The new space will be
used for his existing business and for other commercial uses consistent with the
business now operating in the adjacent properties. The new addition will have a 2-
foot setback and a rear setback of 2 feet. The new space will be used for this
existing business and for other commercial uses consistent with businesses now
operating in the adjacent properties.
4. Ward 5 City Councillor Mike Bencal reported that Mr. Haley met with neighbors in
July 2002 to explain the project, and that the neighborhood was in favor of granting
The variances. Eric Easley of 35 also voiced support for Mr. Haley's project
Mason Street and Arthur Parent of 39 Mason Street.
On the basis of the above findings of fact, and on, the evidence presented at the
hearing, the Zoning Board of Appeal concludes as follows
1. Special conditions exist which especially affect the subject property but not the
District.
2. Literal enforcement of the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance would involve
substantial hardship to the petitioner.
3. Desirable relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good
and without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent of the district or
the purpose of the Ordinance.
Therefore, the Zoning Board of Appeal voted 5-0 to grant the Variances requested,
subject to the following conditions;
1. Petitioner shall comply with all city and state statutes, ordinances, codes and
regulations.
2. All requirements of the Salem Fire Department relative to smoke and fire safety shall
be strictly adhered to.
3. All construction shall be done as per plans submitted and approved by the Building
Commissioner.
4. Petitioner shall obtain a building permit prior to beginning any construction.
5. Exterior finishes of the new construction shall be in harmony with the existing
structure.
6, Petitioner shall obtain a Certificate of Inspection.
DECISION OF THE PETITION OF STEPHEN HALEY REQUESTING A VARIANCE
FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT 41 MASON STREET I
page three
7. Petitioner shall obtain approval from any City Board or Commission having
jurisdiction including but not limited to the Planning Board.
8. No neon signs are to be used.
9. There shall be no outside storage.
10. There shall be no automotive repairs.
11. Hours of operation shall be between 7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.
VARIANCE GRANTED
MARCH 19, 2003
Nina Cohen, Chairman
Board of Appeal
A COPY OF THIS DECISION HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE,PLANNING BOARD AND
THE CIITY CLERK
Appeal from this decision, if any, shall be made pursuant to Section 17 of the
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 40A, and shall be filed within 20 day
date of filing of this decision in the office of the City Clerk. Pursuant to
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 40A, Section 11. The Variance or Special
Permit granted herein shall not take effect until a copy of the decision bearing the
certificate of the City Clerk that 20 days have elapsed and no appeal has been filed,
or that, if such appeal has been filed, that is has been dismissed or denied is
recorded in the South Essex Registry of Deeds and indexed under the name of the
owner of record or is recorded and noted on the owner's Certificate of Title.
Board of Appeal